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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Home on the Range? A More Limited Concept of Curtilage Applied to Rural America. United States v. Dunn,
107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
On November 8, 1982, Ronald Dale Dunn was arrested on his ranch
near Johnson City, Texas, as law enforcement officers executed a search
warrant on a barn in Dunn's ranchyard.' The search netted chemicals and
a lab for illegal manufacture of amphetamine.' Dunn was subsequently
convicted on narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the West
District of Texas.In his appeal, Dunn challenged the trial court's refusal to suppress
the evidence gathered with the search warrant, and the statements he
made after his arrest. He argued that the warrant was based on facts discovered during earlier warrantless forays onto the ranch by law enforcement officers. 4 Dunn claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
ranch buildings. 5 More particularly, he argued that the barn was within
the curtilage6 of the ranch house, and consequently entitled to fourth
amendment protection.7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the barn to be
within the curtilage, and thus "within the protective ambit of the fourth
amendment." 8 Because the officers invaded the curtilage during the warrantless search, the Fifth Circuit reversed.' The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its
decision in Oliver v. United States.'0 Upon remand the Fifth Circuit again
reversed, this time holding that Dunn had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his barn as a commercial building for which he had taken a number of steps to preserve privacy." Six months later, after further
1. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1138 (1987).

2. I&
3. Id. at 1137.
4. Id. at 1138.
5. Id at 1140.

6. Most simply, curtilage has been defined as "the area around the home to which
the activity of home life extends." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984).

The fourth amendment protection of the house has been extended by courts to the curtilage,
which has been protected by common law. Id at 180.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Dun, 107 S. Ct. at 1138.
United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id at 1095.
466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 467 U.S. 1201 (1985). In Oliver, the

Supreme Court more fully developed the open fields doctrine. The Court interpreted the common law distinction between open fields and curtilage as implying privacy expectations only

within the curtilage, and not open fields. Oliver,466 U.S. at 180." 'Open fields' may include
any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside the curtilage. An open field need be neither 'open'
nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common speech.... a thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 180 n.11.
11. United States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880,886 (5th Cir. 1985). Before reaching the question as to whether the barn was entitled to fourth amendment protection as a commercial
building, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the curtilage issue using a three factor test taken from
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956). It concluded, though expressing serious

reservations, that the barn was outside the protected area associated with the ranch house.
Dun, 766 F.2d at 884.
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consideration of Oliver, the Fifth Circuit recalled and vacated this opinion, and reinstated its original holding that the barn was within the protected curtilage.12 After granting the government's petition for certiorari,"
the Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, restoring Dunn's convic14
tion.
The Supreme Court did not directly address the Fifth Circuit's curtilage analysis. Instead, it applied a four factor test to the Dunn barn. 5
The result is that this barn is outside the curtilage, although it is within
the cluster of ranch buildings that includes the house, located in a clearing in the heart of a 198-acre ranch.'
BACKGROUND

The fourth amendment guarantees that "[tihe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'? Fourth amendment guarantees of privacy are based in legitimate expectations of privacy, which
encompass societal notions of reasonableness as well as property interests.' 8 For courts to recognize an expectation of privacy as legitimate,
there must be evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy, and that
subjective expectation must be one that society will recognize as reasonable." Property rights remain an element used to determine whether privacy expectations are legitimate, but they are not controlling.20 Curtilage
- the protected locus of home life - is a privacy concept grounded in a
property interest, the home. It retains vitality as a privacy expectation
which, in contrast to open fields, is clearly recognized as reasonable by

society.2

In Hester u. United States,22 the Supreme Court first distinguished
privacy expectations from property rights in holding that the fourth
amendment does not apply to open fields.2 3 The Court further developed
the distinction between privacy expectations and property rights in Katz
v. United States,24 in which it was stated that the key to fourth amendment protection is an expectation of privacy which society will recognize
12. United States v. Dunn, 782 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986).
13. United States v. Dunn, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
14. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1137.

15. Id at 1139.
16. Id at .1142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
18. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The subjective expectation of privacy must be exhibited, except in the home which is presumptively private. "[W]e do not insist that a person who has the right to exclude others exercises
that right. A claim to privacy is therefore strengthened by the fact that the claimant somehow manifested to other people his desire that they keep their distance." Oliver, 466 U.S.
at 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183.
Id at 180.
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Id at 59.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347.
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as reasonable. 5 Subsequent to Katz, the Supreme Court again addressed
the open fields doctrine in Oliver, establishing the principle that there is
no legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields. 26 The Court considered
this general rule essential to prevent arbitrary enforcement of constitutional rights by enforcement officers. 27 Without a clear standard, officers
are required to determine the extent of their authority to search each time
they are called upon to exercise it."' The Supreme Court based its opinion
on findings that open fields are accessible in ways that houses and commercial buildings are not, and that fences do not prevent the public from
viewing open fields. 9 Consequently, it determined that society does not
recognize a privacy right in them, irrespective of property interests. 0
Although privacy expectations and property interests are not equivalent, as Justice Harlan observed in his concurrence in Katz, the protection
of privacy interests of people usually requires reference to a place.' Open
fields are defined in relation to curtilage - the dwelling and the area of domestic activity immediate to it- to which the privacy expectations of the
house have traditionally extended.2 2 Outbuildings such as garages, barns,
smokehouses and chicken houses have generally been found to be within
the curtilage 8 To reach these results, courts have focused on the actual
extent of home-centered activities, rather than mere physical features,
using phrasing such as "use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family,"2 4 "an integral part of the group of structures
making up the farm home, ,35 "the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends,"I and as "includ[ing] buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs." 37 This curtilage concept
should be, as the Supreme Court stated in Oliver, "easily understood from
our daily experience," 38 and consequently viewed as an area with reasonable privacy expectations by society. Such appeared to be the case until
Dunn, as courts had applied the concept with reasonable consistency. 9
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
Id at 181-82.
Id. at 181.
Id at 179. Commercial buildings, or business premises, may be sheltered by the

fourth amendment from warrantless searches. "The occupant of a commercial building must

take the additional step of effectively barring the public from the area because a business
operator has a reasonable expectation of privacy only in those areas from which the public
has been excluded." Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1147 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
In addition to the claim of error on the issue of curtilage, Dunn also presented a claim

of error based on a reasonable expectation of privacy in his barn as a commercial building.
The discussion of this claim, and the historic roots of this privacy expectation are found
in Dunn. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1146-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
33. Care, 231 F.2d at 25.

34. IM.

35. Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1955).
36. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12.
37. State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1980 (quoting State v. Kender,
60 Haw. 301, 304, 588 P.2d 447, 449 (1978)).
38. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12.
39. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. at 1143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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While no universal formula had been adopted prior to Dunn, the Fifth
Circuit had established a near bright-line rule for curtilage in rural fact
situations. In United States v. Williams,' 0 it held that where outbuildings
are neither within the same enclosure as the house, nor inside an exclusionary fence, the curtilage extends to the outer walls of the furthest outbuildings.' 1 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit recognized that in rural settings
it is reasonable to expect that activities traditionally considered as within the curtilage generally occur throughout the ranch enclave. Other
courts subsequently applied
this standard.2 Against these decisions
42
opinion.
Dunn
the
stands
PRINCIPAL CASE

Physical Setting and Circumstances of Entry
In Dunn, the barn in which law enforcement officers discovered the
illegal lab was in the group of ranch buildings, including the house, at the
end of a half-mile private drive leading from the nearest public road." At
the time of the investigative entries, the entrance to the drive was secured
by a locked gate, and the entire 198-acre ranch was surrounded by a barbed
wire perimeter fence.4 5 The enclave of buildings, including house, garage
and two barns, was set in a clearing surrounded by woods. 46 The house
and a small yard were enclosed by a wire fence, from which it was approximately fifty yards to the barn in question.' 7 The house and barn were
48
connected by both a well-worn footpath and a well used driveway.
Law enforcement officers focused on Dunn's property when they
tracked chemicals and lab equipment purchased by Dunn's confederate
to the ranch." Two officers then made a warrantless investigative foray
onto the ranch, and were standing between the house and barn in question when they detected the odor of phenylacetone. s0 After finding that
a smaller barn contained only empty boxes, the officers crossed a fence
enclosing the front (house side) of the barn, and walked under its overhanging roof in an effort to see through a netting material that hung from
the roof to a locked waist-high gate. 51 From this vantage point, using
40. United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978).
41. Id at 454.
42. United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1374 (11th Cir. 1983); State v. Fierge,
673 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
43. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id at 1142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id at 1137 (majority opinion).
48. Brief for Appellee at 5, United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987) (No. 85-998)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
49. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1137. Dunn's confederate, Carpenter, had been under Drug Enforcement Administration surveillance for several orders of chemicals and equipment used
in the manufacture of amphetamine, some of which were made with an alias. A Texas state
judge granted warrants authorizing installation of electronic beepers on a hot plate stirrer
and subsequently a 55-gallon drum of chemicals ordered by Carpenter. Dunn, 674 F.2d at
1095-96.
50. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Dunn, 766 F.2d at 883.
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52
flashlights to illuminate the barn's interior, they discovered the drug lab.
basis for the search warrant that led to Dunn's
This observation was the
53

arrest and conviction.

The Test
In Dunn, the Supreme Court applied a four factor test to determine
whether or not the curtilage extended to the barn.54 The factors are not
a "finely tuned formula," but are described as tools to help establish
whether the area in question is intimately tied to the home. 5 They are:
1) proximity to the house,
2) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the house,
3) the use of the area, and
4) the effort made to protect the area from observation by any
passerby. 8
The Court decided that the barn was not within the curtilage, as the
distance between the buildings was substantial; the house and barn were
each enclosed by separate fences; the warrantless search established that
the barn was being used solely for illegal activities and not for domestic
to protect the contents
affairs; and finally, Dunn had not done enough
57
of the barn from discovery by passersby.
ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's test is not as practical in rural settings as the
standards developed in prior state and federal court decisions. More significantly, it contradicts objectives for fourth amendment protections and
enforcement articulated by the Court in earlier cases. This analysis addresses the practical problems and contradictions in a factor by factor
review of the Dunn rationale.
Proximity
The Supreme Court quickly dismissed the 50-60 yard separation between the house and barn as a "substantial distance [which] supports "no
58
inference that the barn should be treated as an adjunct of the house.
In response, the dissent points out that several cases have included barns
more than fifty yards from the house in the curtilage, 59 which suggests
that at least there should be no inference that the barn should not be considered adjunct. Consequently, this distance should not be conclusive.
52. Id
53. Law enforcement officers actually made four separate intrusions onto Dunn's ranch
to locate and observe the drug lab. Brief for Appellee, supra note 48, at 1-3.
54. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id
Id
Id at 1140.
Id

59. Id. See, e.g., Williams, 581 F.2d at 453 (50 yards); Walker, 225 F.2d at 448 (70-80
yards); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (100 yards).
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A naked distance in feet or yards is not useful for determining the
extent of home life, which varies in different settings. This is aptly illustrated by the fifty yards between the Dunn house and barn. In an urban
neighborhood with 75-foot lots, fifty yards is a substantial distance; in
fact, it is two lots down the block. Obviously, this is beyond the privacy
expectations, much less the property interests, of one family. However,
fifty yards is a more intimate distance when it lies between a house and
barn found in a cluster of buildings on less than an acre of a 198-acre ranch,
and at the end of a half-mile (880 yards) driveway leading from the nearest
public road. Viewed in their rural setting, these buildings are in proximity, and their close relationship evident.
Fence or Enclosure
Prior to Dunn, yard fences were no longer considered conclusive or
even significant in determining the curtilage in a rural setting.60 Fences
placed to keep livestock out of a yard do not confine the domestic activities of the ranch or farm residents. There may still be eggs to gather, family pets to care for, home projects and other wholly domestic activities
which take place beyond that yard fence but within the enclave around
the house. Those activities that are likely confined by a yard fence in the
city are frequently spread between and among several buildings - and
across fences as well - in the country.
The protective umbrella of curtilage has evolved in decisions involving rural facts as farms and ranches have changed. Although early definitions are tied to physical features, such as a general wall or enclosure,61
recognition of the underlying significance of those features by courts has
led to incorporation of a larger area around the dwelling
that continues
62
to involve domestic activities and family affairs.
Just as some activities have moved inside the dwelling (e.g., the privy),63 others have been moved beyond the yard. In either case, the key
continues to be recognition of the living area.6 ' The expectation of privacy is the same, only the location of the activity has changed. 5 Curtilage
has generally been extended by courts to the
cluster of buildings, or en66
clave, that is today the typical farm home.
60. See, e.g., Williams, 581 F.2d at 454.
61. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 ("[Ilf the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and within the same common fence, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capitol house
protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants, if within the curtilage or
homestall.").
62. This larger area is most clearly enunciated in Williams, 581 F.2d at 451.
63. Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfie& The Neglected Threshold of "So What?", S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 87 (1977).
64. Id.
65. Id
66. See, e.g., Walker, 225 F.2d at 449; Williams, 581 F.2d at 454; Fierge, 673 S.W.2d
at 856; Luman v. Oklahoma, 629 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Lee, 120
Or. 643, 648, 253 P. 533, 534 (1927).
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Though the open fields doctrine establishes that property lines are
not necessarily to be considered as privacy barriers,6 7 it seems clear that
the perimeter fence around a ranch or farm commonly serves the same
purpose as a yard fence in urban settings - the general fence that defines
the property limit. The fact that this fence in the city also serves neatly
to describe the curtilage should not be used to penalize rural residents,
whose many fences serve a variety of functions, though not that of setting the limits of family life. The enclave is "readily recognizable" when
viewed in scale, and any enclosure around the house has little meaning
given the way ranch homes are managed today.
Nature of Use
In applying this factor, the Court contradicts the reasoning behind
the principle of generality it established in Oliver to ensure proper enforcement actions in open field settings. 6 In Oliver, the Court was concerned
that an "ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority (citation omitted), it also creates a
danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced."1 9 Because of the inherent dangers in a case-by-case approach, the
Court concluded that it was unworkable for courts, field enforcement
officers and citizens.7 0 Consequently, it stated as a general principle that
"open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that
the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or

surveillance. "71
Just as open fields are unlikely to be the setting for constitutionally
sheltered activities, farm outbuildings clustered around the house, and
72
the intervening grounds are likely to be used in daily domestic affairs.
This is implicit in the Court's statement in Oliver that "an individual may
not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home."73 (emphases
added).
Yet with the Dunn test, the enforcement officer is expected to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the use of each outbuilding is domestic before establishing whether or not it is entitled to fourth amendment
protection. The concerns about inequitable enforcement are even more
glaring here, yet the door is left open for gross violations of constitutional privacy guarantees.
Essentially what the Court permits with Dunn is a search-to-establisha-privacy-right approach. In this case, the search revealed that the use
of the barn was not domestic, and the Court's test placed it outside the
67. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th
Cir. 1982)).
68. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181-82.
70. Id. at 181.
71. It at 179.
72. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1988

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 23 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIII

curtilage.7' However, the next time the test is applied in the field by enforcement officers, the intrusion may just as likely establish that the building in question is used for domestic purposes,75 and it may be found within
the curtilage in that case. The unfortunate result is a violation of the fourth
amendment to establish a right of that amendment's protection. As the
curtilage is considered part of the house for fourth amendment purposes,M
what the Court endorses is fundamentally no different than permitting
warrantless entry into a house to seek grounds for a warrant to search
that house.77 By inquiring into the nature of use, and approving the sort
of action taken by the officers in Dunn, the Court establishes an unworkable and constitutionally unsound approach.
The appropriate course to ensure protection of legitimate privacy expectations is to assume that the outbuildings around the house are used
for family purposes, as people with daily experience in rural areas understand, unless contrary evidence is developed without invading the presumed curtilage. There is a danger of violation of constitutional rights
of farmers and ranchers in any case-by-case approach to establish use.
A general rule is essential to prevent the problems inherent in requiring
law enforcement officers to determine nature of use, as the Court had earlier recognized in Oliver."
Effort to Preserve Privacy
This factor is new to the curtilage analysis with Dunn, and appears
to be an incorporation of the subjective expectation element used to evaluate the reasonableness of privacy expectations in commercial property."
It is difficult to see why the Court added this factor to the curtilage analysis. Although actions demonstrating subjective expectations may have
bearing on establishing a protected privacy right, the key is clearly societal recognition of an expectation as reasonable.80 In extending fourth
amendment protection to curtilage, courts have validated this expectation of privacy as a reasonable extension of the house, which has inherent protection, regardless of protective efforts.
Efforts to preserve privacy should have no bearing on maintaining
the status of an area as within the curtilage. The measure of curtilage
is the area's association with the house and domestic affairs, 1 and not
whether it has been screened or fenced. The yard around a city home is
readily recognizable as a part of the house's curtilage, whether or not a
physical barrier exists at its boundary. Illegal objects or activities within
74. Dunr, 107 S. Ct. at 1139-40.
75. Certainly, even if the building is used for both domestic and illegal purposes, the
privacy protections of curtilage still apply. "Dual use does not strip a home or any building
within the curtilage of Fourth Amendment protection." Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1145 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
76. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
77. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
79. See Dunr 107 S. Ct. at 1146-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
81. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.
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the curtilage plainly visible from unprotected areas are subject to enforcement action, but the curtilage remains curtilage, and cannot otherwise
be searched without a warrant.2 Use in the daily affairs of family life,
and not physical barriers, limits warrantless intrusions.
Even if this were an appropriate factor for identifying the curtilage,
clearly Dunn made efforts to ensure his privacy in the barn from observation by those passing by. The entire perimeter of the ranch was fenced,
the gate at the end of the drive locked, and the buildings not even visible
from the road.83 The interior of the barn was not visible from three sides.
On the fourth side, which faced the house and was connected to it by foot
and vehicle paths, another fence enclosed the barn and limited access to
any point where the contents of the interior could be observed.8 4 Even
if a "passerby" was to climb this fence and approach the barn, at this
point in full view of the house, it was still necessary to stand against the
waist-high locked gate, under the overhanging roof, and use a flashlight
to penetrate the netting hanging from roof to gate to discover its contents.8 5 From just a few feet away, the fence and netting obscured the
interior of the barn. 8 If these efforts were inadequate to demonstrate an
effort to ensure privacy, then few houses would meet the Court's standard.
Consideration of efforts to preserve privacy is not appropriate in a
curtilage analysis since curtilage is based in the privacy expectation inherent in the house. Anything within the curtilage is entitled to the highest
privacy expectations regardless of how well it is protected. Analysis must
begin and end with the barn's functional relationship to the house. If it
is within the curtilage, it is entitled to the highest privacy expectations,
and efforts to protect it are irrelevant.
CONCLUSION

Though denying any intent to establish a "bright-line rule," 87 Dunn
comes perilously close to doing so, with unfortunate consequences for rural
citizens. Fifty yards becomes a "substantial distance,"8 a negative inference as applied by the Court. Yard fences are "significant,"8 9 and while
perimeter fences are not important, the Court gives fencing configurations
that separate the ranch buildings great weight.9 Grounds and outbuildings beyond any yard around the dwelling are presumptively in the open
fields,"' and therefore open to warrantless entry to establish use. Ap82. This point was most recently discussed in Ciraolo v. United States, 476 U.S. 207
(1986), which involved the aerial observation of marijuana in a yard surrounded by an exclusionary fence. The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment was not violated by nakedeye aerial observation of the curtilage.
83. Dunn, 766 F.2d at 882.
84. Id at 883.
85. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1137.
86. Dunn, 766 F.2d at 883.
87. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1139 n.4.
88. Id. at 1140.
89. Id
90. Id.
91. Id
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parently the Court endorses an "enter first, then establish use" approach.
The test is complicated by requiring efforts to preserve privacy in an area
that has from common law been afforded the highest protections without
such a prerequisite. The Court then handicaps rural residents when applying this factor, by refusing to consider wire fences as having any exclusionary function. As a result, farm and ranch outbuildings are now
generally outside the curtilage unless enclosed by more substantial fences
or until their use can be established, apparently by warrantless searches.
The objective of eliminating illegal drug trafficking is keenly important to all citizens, but this decision ultimately does little to achieve it,
while dramatically cutting back privacy protections for farm and ranch
families. Criminals need only move inside the fenced yard, or move the
yard fence. Meanwhile, ranchers going about the activities of home life
may now find law enforcement officers lawfully among, and even in their
outbuildings without a warrant.
Prior cases had established a concept of curtilage that was both more
workable and more consistent with the fourth amendment. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court chose to strike off in a new direction by
trying to shrink-fit the ranch home into an urban mold. The consequence
is an erosion of the rights of rural citizens.
STEPHEN
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